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RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION: A HISTORICAL
CASE FOR EQUAL TREATMENT UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
SANDRA L. RIERSON"
It was we, the people, not we, the white male citizens, nor yet we, the male citi-
zens, but we, the whole people, who formed this Union. And we formed it, not to
give the blessings of liberty, but to secure them; not to the half of ourselves and the
half of our posterity, but to the whole people-women as well as men.
-Susan B. Anthony'
Under the common law of both England and the United States, a mar-
ried woman enjoyed a legal status only slightly better than that of a slave.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, in no state could a married American
woman own property, make a will, inherit, sue or be sued, enter into a
contract, or exercise any other of her most basic civil rights. Even single and
widowed women, many of whom owned large amounts of property, were
deprived of political rights: they could not vote, hold office, or sit on a jury.
The gradual dissolution of women's inferior legal status began with the
passage of married women's property laws, beginning before the Civil War
and continuing throughout the twentieth century.
In an even more brutal fashion, the institution of slavery stripped Black
Americans of all their human, civil, political, and social rights.' In Dred Scott
v. Sanford the Supreme Court determined that, even if Blacks were "free,"
they were not "citizens" of the United States.3 This Supreme Court ruling
was superseded by the passage of the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth
Amendments in 1865 and 1868 respectively, in which Congress emancipated
Blacks, expressly granted them citizenship status, and sought to protect their
civil rights.
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law clerk to Judge Richard A. Gadbois, United States District Court for the Central District of
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1. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, 2 HISTORY OF WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE: 1861-1876, at 632 (Amo
Press ed., 1969) (1881).
2. In this Article, I have used the term "Black" when referring to persons of African
heritage living in the United States, rather than "African-American". I realize that "African-
American" more accurately describes such persons today, but given the historical context of
this Article, the term did not seem appropriate. During much of the time period discussed in
this Article, Blacks in the United States were enslaved. Even when they were technically
"free", the Supreme Court refused to recognize their national citizenship. I therefore question
whether Blacks in the United States would have considered themselves to be "African-Ameri-
cans" during this time period.
3. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416 (1857).
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Congress did not extend the political rights of citizenship to Black males
until it adopted the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870. Until this development,
advocates of women's rights in the nineteenth century considered Black
males' legal status to be equal to their own-that of "second-class citi-
zens"-citizens with some civil, but no political rights.' The Woman's Move-
ment, led by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, began as a
counterpart to and an ally of the Abolition Movement. However, when Con-
gress amended the Constitution to forbid discrimination in voting on the
basis of race-but not on the basis of gender-the alliance abruptly ended.
This Article does not argue that women of all races and Black men
have experienced identical levels of oppression in American society, nor that
the relationship between husband and wife in the nineteenth century was
perfectly analogous to that of master and slave. In theory, a husband's love
for his wife should have prevented him from abusing the legal superiority
that he enjoyed over her.' Few would suggest that such a bond existed be-
tween the slave and his master.6
Yet historically, women and Blacks in America have shared a common
experience, especially in the context of those rights protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment. Sexism and racism in American society have prevented
women of all races and Black men from enjoying the rights-civil, social,
and political-to which they are entitled under the Constitution. Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that all United States citizens are
entitled to the "Privileges and Immunities" of that citizenship (civil rights),
and that all persons are entitled to "Due Process" and "Equal Protection" of
4. Race and sex are clearly not mutually exclusive categories. It seems patently obvious
that at least half of all Blacks are female. Yet although half of all slaves were women, the
Fifteenth Amendment's protection against disenfranchisement on the grounds of "previous
condition of servitude" only extended to those Blacks who were men.
The Woman's Movement has historically failed adequately to address the needs of Black
women. Angela P. Harris comments on modern feminists' tendency to perpetuate this failure.
See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 581-
616 (1990). These issues became particularly relevant recently in the context of Justice Clarence
Thomas' Senate confirmation hearings and the role played in those hearings by Professor
Anita Hill. See Christine Stansell, White Feminists and Black Realities: The Politics of Authenticity,
in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 251-268 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Whose Story Is It Anyway-Feminist and Antiracist Appropriations of Anita Hill, in RACE-NG Jus-
TICE, supra at 402, 403-406.
5. Nineteenth century women's rights advocates argued that it did not. They challenged
the ideal vision of marriage and motherhood popularized in this era. With regard to the holy
bond of matrimony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton wrote, "lilt is folly to talk of the sacredness of
marriage and maternity, while the wife is practically regarded as ... a slave." ELIZABETH
CADY STANTON, The Arena, in EIGHTY YEARS AND MORE: REMINISCENCES 1815-1897, at 230
(Schoken Books ed., 1971) (1898) [hereinafter REMINISCENCES].
6. Although the notion that a slave loved his master in the same way that a wife loved
her husband is perverse and false, much of Southern literature and culture reflects that
society's desire to indulge in this illusion and to romanticize slavery. Civil War scenes from
GONE WITH THE WIND depicted loyal enslaved house servants fighting to protect their master,
rather than joining forces with the "Damn Yankees." See MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH
THE WIND (1936). The silent film BIRTH OF A NATION (Hollywood Home Theater 1980) (1915),
presented the Civil War in a similar fashion.
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the laws.7 In interpreting these clauses of the Constitution, courts have ac-
knowledged the effects of racism on Blacks and all other racial minorities.8
However, the deleterious effects of sexism on women have been discounted.
This Article argues that the judiciary should use strict scrutiny when
reviewing discrimination based on sex as well as when reviewing discrimi-
nation based on race. Sexism and racism are pervasive prejudices that have
been nurtured and encouraged by our laws. Each has been manifested and
maintained by the law in the past, hence the need for the law to rectify the
effects of this discrimination in the present.
I. THEORETICAL PARALLELS BETWEEN RACE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION
In his essay, The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill constructs many
theoretical parallels between the status of women and Blacks in Western
society.' He notes that "[liaws and systems of polity always begin by
recognising the relations they find already existing between individuals.
They convert what was a mere physical fact into a legal right . . . "" Mill
argues in this manner that the underpinnings of slavery advanced from the
simple rule of "might makes right" to the level of legal right and contract,
whereby one race subjugated another.
By this same evolutionary process the common law of "Husband and
Wife" codified man's rule over woman. An anonymous seventeenth-century
English legal scholar made the following analogy:
When a small brooke or little river incorporateth with Rhodanus, Humber,
or the Thames, the poor rivulet looseth her name .... See here the rea-
son ... that women have no voice in Parliament. They make no laws, they
consent to none, they abrogate none. All of them are understood either mar-
ried, or to be married, and their desires are to their husbands."
For centuries the subordinate status of both slaves and women in America
was considered to be the natural state of society predestined by Divine
will, 2 and recognized as such by the United States Supreme Court. With
respect to slavery, Chief Justice Taney observed in Dred Scott that, when the
Founding Fathers wrote the Declaration of Independence, the legitimacy of
slavery "was ... fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the white
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
8. The Supreme Court extended strict scrutiny analysis to include minorities other than
Blacks early in the history of its Equal Protection analysis. It provided little explanation for
this expansion of Fourteenth Amendment protection. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886) (applying strict scrutiny analysis to racial discrimination against Asians).
9. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS ON SEx EQUALITY 125 (Alice S.
Rossi ed., 1970).
10. Id. at 130.
11. The Lawoes Resolutions of Women's Rights, in ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY, supra note 9, at
53.
12. Elizabeth Cady Stanton rejected many traditional ideas about God's intended place for
women in society, and in 1895 she published her theories in The Woman's Bible. See REMINIS-
CENCES, supra note 5, at 452-57. For a general discussion of the interaction of religion and the
woman suffrage movement, see AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE
MOVEMENT, 1890-1920, at 75-95 (1965).
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race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals as well as in politics ..,,"
With respect to the status of women, in 1872, Justice Bradley, concurring in
Bradwell v. Illinois, remarked that "[tihe paramount destiny and mission of
woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This is
the law of the Creator."' As if in response, Mill asks: "[Wias there ever
any domination which did not appear natural to those who possessed it?" 5
A. MARRIED WOMEN AND SLAVES
By the dawn of the age of Enlightenment, a married woman's status
had changed little under the common law,6 except insofar as most of her
legal disabilities were now more directly tied to the contract of marriage,
rather than to her status as female. 7 At the same time, most of the nations
of the Western hemisphere had abolished the institution of slavery, with one
glaring exception: the United States. The emergence of the Woman's Move-
ment was clearly linked-both temporally and ideologically-with the drive
to end slavery. 8
One of the first abolitionists explicitly to link the causes of racial and
sexual equality was Sarah Grimke, a Quaker 9 and former slaveowner's
13. 60 U.S. at 407.
14. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
15. John Stuart Mill, supra note 9, at 137.
16. Sir William Blackstone wrote one of the leading treatises on the status of the common
law in the eighteenth century, the COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765). In a
section entitled "Husband and Wife," Blackstone states:
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being,
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband under whose wing, protec-
tion and cover she performs everything.
Id. at 442.
17. Sir Henry Maine suggested that a shift in emphasis from Status (i.e., sex, race, class,
or pedigree) to Contract (a relationship into which an individual willfully entered) was part
of the natural evolution of a progressive legal system. SIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 100
(1861). See also HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, CON-
STITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 50-51 (1982). One result of this development was
that, by the end of the nineteenth century, all ommon law property states had passed some
form of statute protecting the property rights of married women. See Richard H. Chused,
Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1398 (1983).
18. For many women in the United States, involvement in the abolitionist movement led
to a recognition of their own inferior status. At its 1863 national convention, the Women's
National Loyal League passed a resolution in support of equal civil and political rights for
"citizens of African descent" and white women. STANTON, supra note 1, at 57-66. Delegate
Angeline G. Weld stated:
I rejoice exceedingly that that resolution should combine us 'with the negro. I feel
that we have been with him; that the iron has entered into our souls. True, we
have not felt the slave-holder's lash; true, we have not had our hands manacled,
but our hearts have been crushed.
Id. at 60.
19. The egalitarian ideals propounded by the Hicksite Quaker community inspired many
early activists for abolition and women's rights. See SARA M. EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY: A
HISTORY OF WOMEN IN AMERICA 79-81 (1989); ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE:
THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869, at 36-38
(1978).
Volume 1:89 1994
RACE AND GENDER 93
daughter from South Carolina. In a letter to the Boston Female Antislavery
Society entitled the "Legal Disabilities of Women," Grimke systematically
compares the status of women and slaves under the common law." She
writes that the "unjust and unequal laws" that wrested a woman's rights
from her "approximate too nearly to the laws enacted by slaveholders for
the government of their slaves, and must tend to debase and depress the
mind of [woman]." 2
Almost all of Grimke's analysis focuses on the "legal disabilities" at-
tached to married women. Grimke notes that, upon taking the vows of mar-
riage, "the very being of a [married] woman, like that of a slave, is absorbed
in her master. All contracts made with her, like those made with slaves by
their owners, are a mere nullity."22 In the eyes of the law, the married
woman ceased to exist. The theoretical nonexistence of married women un-
der the common law had many practical consequences. Married women
could neither make contracts nor own property. 3 Anything that a woman
possessed before she married or acquired during her marriage automatically
became the property of her husband.24 Grimke notes that the laws of Loui-
siana imposed a similar condition upon the slave: "All that a slave possesses
belongs to his master; he possesses nothing of his own, except what his
master chooses ... 25
The common law of torts also clearly reflected the legal nonexistence of
married women and slaves. A wife had no right to sue her husband, just as
a slave had no right to sue his master. If a wife were injured in a tort ac-
tion, she could only sue the tortfeasor in her husband's name, and then only
with his permission. Grimke notes that "if any damages are recovered for an
injury committed on a wife, the husband pockets it; in the case of the slave,
the master does the same." 26 This feature of the common law derived from
the theory that the wife/slave was the property of the husband/master;
hence, he was entitled to compensation for any damage done to such prop-
erty. Likewise, the common law did not hold a woman liable for any torts
committed in her husband's presence; the man was held accountable for his
wife's actions. This evokes the common law rule that also held the master
liable for the torts of his servant.
Other than Susan B. Anthony, all of the major leaders of the nineteenth-
century Woman's Movement were married women. Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
herself married with seven children, wrote much about the legal disabilities
attached to the marital vow. In her autobiography she observed that,
20. Letter from Sarah Grimke to the Boston Female Antislavery Society (Sept. 6, 1837), in
LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND OTHER ESSAYS, at 71-77 (Elizabeth Ann Bartlett
ed., 1988).
21. Id. at 77.
22. Id. at 72. See also John Stuart Mill, supra note 9, at 158.
23. 1 ANN OLDFATHER ET AL., VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY §3.02
(1984).
24. See generally, JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 324-25 (2nd. ed. 1988).
25. Grimke, supra note 20, at 75.
.26. Id. at 73.
27. Stanton convinced the minister conducting her own marriage ceremony to omit the
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while an unmarried woman could "make contracts, sue and be sued, enjoy
the rights of property, to her inheritance-to her wages-to her person-to
her children . . . in marriage, she is robbed by law of all and every natural
and civil right."' Another outspoken crusader for women's rights, Lucy
Stone, gained national attention by marrying the prominent abolitionist Hen-
ry Blackwell. Stone and Blackwell executed a contract disavowing the inferi-
or legal status attached to the wife under the common law, and Stone re-
fused to change her maiden name.29
B. UNMARRIED WHITE WOMEN AND BLACK FREEDMEN
The Woman's Movement did not focus its efforts solely on eliminating
the legal disabilities attached to the marital vow; the Movement recognized
that even single women could not exercise many of the basic rights to which
all white men were entitled. All women, married or single, were denied
every political right traditionally associated with citizenship, including the
right to vote, the right to serve on juries, and the right to hold public of-
fice.' Many widowed and single women owned large amounts of property
and real estate, and the cry of "no taxation without representation" was
often heard from the suffragists.' Scattered signs of protest from other un-
married women can be found throughout American history," but in general
word "obey" from the vows: "I obstinately refused to obey one with whom I supposed I was
entering into an equal relations." REMINISCENCES, sitpra note 5, at 72.
28. Id. at 222.
29. The marriage contract by Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell reads as follows:
This act on our part implies no sanction of, nor promise of voluntary obedience
to . . the present laws of marriage, as [they] refuse to recognize the wife as an
independent, rational being, while they confer upon the husband an injurious and
unnatural superiority .... We protest ... the whole system by which 'the legal
existence of the wife is suspended during marriage,' so that in most States, she
neither has a legal part in the choice of her residence, nor can she make a will, nor
sue or be sued in her own name, nor inherit property.
Lucy Stone & Henry Blackwell, Marriage Contract, in Wendy McElroy, The Roots of Individual-
ist Feminism in 19th-Century America, in FREEDOM, FEMINISM, AND THE STATE 119 (McElroy ed.,
1982).
30. See HARRIET TAYLOR MILL, ENFRANCHISEMENT OF WOMEN 91, 104 (1869).
31. Elizabeth Cady Stanton addressed the New York State legislature at its 1867 constitu-
tional convention and argued for amendment of the state constitution to grant suffrage rights
to women. She made the following comment regarding taxation of property-holding women:
[U]nmarried women have always had the right to property and wages; to make
contracts and do business in their own name. And even married women, by recent
legislation in this State, have been secured in some civil rights .... Woman now
holds a vast amount of property in the country, and pays her full proportion of
taxes. . . .On what principle, then, do you deny her representation? If, the 'white
male' will do all the voting, let him pay all the taxes.
STANTON, supra note 1, at 274. See also JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 9, at 97.
32. For example, in 1647 the recently-widowed Margaret Brent asked the Maryland As-
sembly to grant her two votes, one in her own capacity as a freeholder, and one as the exec-
utor of her husband's estate. Her recently deceased husband had been the governor of the
colony. The Assembly replied that, being a woman, she was entitled to no vote. See J.C.
SPRUILL, WOMEN'S LIFE AND WORK IN THE SOUTHERN COLONIES 237-38 (1938).
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the law made no distinction between married and single women in denying
their political rights.
The legal status of unmarried white women and Black freedmen in the
North was very similar during the antebellum period.33 Like the unmarried
white woman, the Black freedman was more likely to enjoy his basic "civil"
rights, such as the right to contract or own property, than his "political"
rights, such as the right to sit on a jury, vote, or hold office. In many free
states, Blacks were guaranteed the right to contract and to own property.'
By 1860, free Blacks were allowed to vote in Maine, New Hampshire, Ver-
mont, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island-in these states free Blacks possessed
almost all of the traditional rights of full citizenship.35
Despite the fact that several states' laws granted the Black freedman a
litany of rights, the Supreme Court held in Dred Scott that Blacks were not
entitled to those rights because they were not citizens of the United States.'
On the other hand, Dred Scott recognized that white women, both married
and unmarried, were "citizens," although that status did not enhance the
character of their legal rights."
C. THE LINKAGE BETWEEN CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN AND
BLACKS
Prior to the Civil War and the enactment of the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, few Blacks' and no women39 enjoyed any of the po-
litical rights of citizenship, such as voting or office-holding. Theoretically, it
is easy to understand why these rights were denied to married women and
slaves under the common law. However, it is more difficult to rationalize
the deprivation of political rights for freedmen and unmarried white women.
33. Although free Blacks in the Southern States technically enjoyed some civil rights, they
were treated more like slaves than free men. Although free Blacks in the South were allowed
to own property, the law often dictated that they could do so only under the agency of a
white guardian. See generally, Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal
Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 477 (1986). Of all the Southern States, only
Louisiana allowed Blacks to testify against whites. Id. at 451.
34. Id. at 477.
35. Id. at 422, 424-25. New York imposed a property qualification upon Black voters, Ohio
allowed mulattoes to vote, and Michigan only allowed Blacks to vote in school board elec-
tions. Id. at 477-78. Blacks were allowed to testify against whites in all non-slave states, except
Indiana and Illinois. California adopted a law allowing Blacks to testify against whites in
1863; Oregon did so in 1862. Id. at 451. But see LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE
NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 (1961) (offering a more pessimistic conception of free
Blacks' status in the Antebellum North).
36. 60 U.S. at 405-406. See text accompanying note 98, infra.
37. The Court notes that "a person may be a citizen, and entitled to that character, al-
though he does not possess all the rights which belong to other citizens .... Women and
minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote [or hold public office] . . .yet
they are citizens." 60 U.S. at 421-22.
38. See Finkelman, supra note 33, at 417.
39. Women first attained the right to vote in some of the territories, but not until after
the Civil War. Woman suffrage was approved in the Wyoming territory in 1869 and in Utah
in 1870. Women were allowed to vote in the Washington territory between 1883 and 1889. See
MILDRED ADAMS, THE RIGHT TO BE PEOPLE 68-69 (1966); STANTON, supra note 1, at 508.
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Although no state ever distinguished between married and unmarried wom-
en with respect to voting rights, the question was occasionally discussed.'
Democratic theory assumes that the individual must attain a very basic
level of independence before she can participate in civil society: self-owner-
ship. The common law treated slaves like any other piece of property owned
by their masters, thus they obviously did not meet this qualification. A
white woman could not be bought or sold; yet when she married, law and
custom granted her husband complete control over her person, her property,
and her labor.41 Children were controlled by their fathers, who automatical-
ly retained custody of them in the event of a divorce. Therefore, slaves of ei-
ther sex and any age, married white women, and children did not possess
the requisite self-ownership to participate in the political community.42
The eighteenth century Federalists' definition of political rights echoes
this theme; they reasoned that only those owning a "stake in the communi-
ty" (i.e., property) should have a voice in its governance.43 John Adams ar-
gued, based on the works of Blackstone" and Montesquieu, 4s that property
qualifications for voting were necessary to exclude people who were depen-
dent on others to feed, clothe, and employ them, and thus whose vote could
be controlled.46 Although Adams went so far as to acknowledge that "gen-
erally speaking, women and children have as good judgements, and as inde-
pendent minds, as those men who are wholly destitute of property,"47 he
failed to articulate any reason for distinguishing among adult property-hold-
ers on the basis of race and sex.
On the same subject, Justice Story wrote:
[I]t would be extremely difficult, upon any mere theoretical reasoning, to
establish any satisfactory principle, upon which the one half of every society
40. For example, at the 1820 Massachusetts constitutional convention, some members of
the delegation suggested that unmarried women who owned property be given the vote.
Their motion did not prevail. STANTON, supra note 1, at 586.
41. Even if they were "freed", Black married women continued to suffer these same legal
disabilities.
42. See DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 44-46. The legal status of children has also been com-
pared to that of slaves. See Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992).
43. See Linda K. Kerber, From the Declaration of Independence to the Declaration of Sentiments:
The Legal Status of Women in the Early Republic, 1776-1848, 6 HUM. RTs. 115, 118 (1977).
44. Blackstone notes:
The true reason of requiring any qualification with regard to property in voters is
to exclude such persons, as are in so mean a situation, that they are esteemed to
have no will of their own .... [AIIl popular states have been obliged to establish
certain qualifications, whereby some, who are suspected to have no will of their
own, are excluded from voting, in order to set other individuals, whose will may be
supposed independent, more thoroughly upon a level with each other.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 16, at 171-2.
45. See CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 11 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, 151-
62 (Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publishing Co. 2nd ed. 1959).
46. ANNE F. SCOTT & ANDREW M. SCOTT, ONE HALF THE PEOPLE: THE FIGHT FOR WOMAN
SUFFRAGE 4 (1975).
47. Letter from John Adams in reply to a constituent (May 26, 1776) in 9 WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, at 375-77 (C.F. Adams ed., 1854) (reprinted in SCOTT & SCOTT, supra note 46).
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has thus been systematically excluded by the other half from all right of
participation in government.... If it be said, that all men have a natural,
equal and unalienable right to vote ... what [consideration] is not equally
applicable to females, as free, intelligent, moral, responsible beings . . . hav-
ing a vital stake in all the regulations and laws of society?'
It is fair to say that, under the common law, married women were not con-
sidered free and responsible beings. However, this theoretical rationale for
excluding the married woman from the political community does not apply
to the single woman. Justice Bradley's concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois ad-
dresses the issue:
[Miany women are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties . .. and
incapacities arising out of the married state, . . . [yet] these are exceptions to
the general rule. And the rules of civil society must be adapted to the gener-
al constitution of things, and cannot be based upon exceptional cases. 9
This unsatisfactory explanation is essentially identical to that delivered in
1624, when all women were considered either "married or to be married"
and thus treated with equal disregard by the common law.'
Other language in Justice Bradley's Bradwell concurrence sheds a harsher
light on the reasoning underlying his refusal to distinguish between married
and unmarried women. He states generally that "[m]an is, or should be,
woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and deli-
cacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the
occupations of civil life ... "51 Justice Bradley was not alone in his think-
ing. When debating woman suffrage, members of the House and Senate also
voiced the opinion that a woman's place in society was strictly limited to the
domestic sphere.52
When Dred Scott addressed the question of a freedman's right to sue,
the Supreme Court held that Blacks, both free and enslaved, were guaran-
48. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 79
(1991). Examining the theory of voting as a civil, as opposed to a natural, right, Justice Story
notes that "it will require some astuteness to find upon what ground this exclusion [of wom-
en] can be vindicated .... " Id. at 80.
49. 83 U.S. at 141-42 (Bradley, J., concurring) (the majority held that the state of Illinois
could legally refuse to admit Myra Bradwell to the state bar on the basis of her sex because,
as a married woman, Bradwell would not be bound by her express or implied contracts, such
as those between attorney and client).
50. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
51. 83 U.S. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
52. On May 28, 1874, Senator Sargent, a California Republican, proposed an amendment
to extend the right of suffrage to women in the Pembina Territory (what is today North
Dakota). Senator Bayard opposed the amendment on the following grounds:
Under the operation of the amendment, what will become of the family
hearthstone . . . ? You will no longer have that healthful and necessary subordina-
tion of wife to husband .... I can see in this proposition for female suffrage the
end of all that home life and education which are the best nursery for a nation's
virtue .... [Tihere never was a falser fact stated than that the women of America
need any protection further than the love borne to them by their fellow-countrymen.
STANTON, supra note 1, at 577 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. 4331-44 (1874)).
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teed no rights--civil, social, or political-by the United States Constitution.53
Justice Taney reasoned that Blacks were not citizens because at the time the
Constitution was drafted, they were "considered as a subordinate and inferi-
or class of beings .. .and had no rights or privileges but such as ... the
Government might choose to grant them."'
In other words, the legal disabilities imposed on women and Blacks by
the common law stemmed from pervasive racist and sexist beliefs. In this
context, racism and sexism can be broadly defined as the belief that these
two classes of humanity-women and Blacks-were unfit or incapable of
carrying out the civil and political functions of the society. These ideas trace
their roots deep into the bedrock of tradition and custom. Applying Mill's
analysis, the seed of these beliefs lies in the simple rule that in nature, the
strong will always rule those weaker than themselves.'5 Mill also points out
that, under such a system, society becomes dependent on the coerced work
of the oppressed. He compares the following statements:
It is necessary that cotton and sugar should be grown. White men can-
not produce them. Negroes will not, for any wages which we choose to
give. Ergo they must be compelled ...
It is necessary to society that women should marry and produce chil-
dren. They will not do so unless they are compelled. Therefore it is neces-
sary to compel them.'
Mill speculates that society has forced women to focus all their energies on
marrying and bearing children by foreclosing their opportunities to do any-
thing else. He suggests that instead, society should focus on improving
woman's status within marriage, rather than forcing her to live under a "law
of despotism.""'
Until the nineteenth century, racist and sexist assumptions about the
status of Blacks and white women living in America went largely unchal-
lenged. Although Blacks, 58 and to a lesser extent white women,59 had pre-
viously emitted scattered signs of protest, an organized movement did not
emerge until this time. The crusade for women's rights evolved out of the
fight for abolitionism and established itself as a separate movement when a
53. 60 U.S. at 404-405.
54. Id. at 405.
55. Although Mill does not identify the following as "sexism", he essentially reaches the
same conclusion: "I believe that [women's] disabilities ... are only clung to in order to
maintain their subordination in domestic life; because the generality of the male sex cannot
yet tolerate the idea of living with an equal." John Stuart Mill, supra note 9, at 181.
56. Id. at 155.
57. Id. at 156.
58. See, e.g., HENRY IRVING TRAGLE, THE SOUTHAMPTON SLAVE REVOLT OF 1831: A COMPI-
LATION OF SOURCE MATERIAL (1971) (documenting Nat Turner's 1831 slave rebellion in
Southampton, Virginia).
59. Abigail Adams expressed an early feminist sentiment when she wrote to her husband,
"[ilf particular care and attention is not paid to the ladies, we are determined to foment a
rebellion, and will not hold ourselves bound by any laws in which we have no voice or
representation." Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31, 1777), in FAMILIAR LET-
TERS OF JOHN ADAMS AND HIS WIFE, ABIGAIL ADAMS DURING THE REVOLUTION 149-50 (C. Ad-
ams ed., 1876), reprinted in THE FEMINIST PAPERS 7-15 (A.S. Rossi ed., 1973).
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group of female abolitionists were made conscious of their own inferior legal
status by the abolitionist movement itself.
H. HISTORIC LINKS BETWEEN THE RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOR WOMEN AND BLACK
MEN
Like all social phenomena, the Woman's Movement emerged gradually
over a long period of time. However, the date which has historically signi-
fied the beginning of an organized campaign for women's rights is July 19,
1848-the date of the Seneca Falls Convention. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and
Lucretia Mott resolved to orchestrate this gathering after being humiliated at
the 1840 World Anti-Slavery Convention in England, when, following a bitter
debate, the Convention refused to seat any female delegates.' According to
Stanton, women were rejected because, "according to English prejudices at
that time, [women] were excluded by Scriptural texts from sharing equal
dignity and authority with men in all reform associations... ."' To show
their support for the disqualified women, William Lloyd Garrison and other
prominent American abolitionists refused to participate in the conference.
For eight years following the Convention, the duties of marriage and
motherhood precluded Mott and Stanton from proceeding with their plans to
organize a meeting on the status of women. Finally, on July 14, 1848, they
published a call to attend a "Women's Rights Convention" in the Seneca
County Courier.' The document that emerged from the Seneca Falls meet-
ing-the Declaration of Sentiments-essentially became the manifesto of the
Woman's Movement.' Copies of the Declaration and Resolutions endorsing
60. See REMINISCENCES, supra note 5, at 79-83; ADAMS, supra note 47, at 23-24. Other wom-
en also returned from the London convention newly resolved to campaign for women's
rights; upon arriving home in Pennsylvania, Mary Grew began circulating petitions for a
married woman's property act. Her abolitionist father vigorously opposed her efforts. DuBois,
supra note 19, at 25.
61. REMINISCENCES, supra note 5, at 79. Stanton remarked that "[it was really pitiful to
hear narrow-minded bigots, pretending to be teachers and leaders of men, so cruelly remand-
ing their own mothers, with the rest of womankind, to absolute subjection to the ordinary
masculine type of humanity." Id. at 81.
62. Id. at 148.
63. The Declaration was composed and delivered by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and signed
by all in attendance. Stanton modeled the introduction after the Declaration of Independence,
emphasizing women's natural rights:
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created
equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that
among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these
rights governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.
The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on
the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an
absolute tyranny over her. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.
He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective
franchise.
He has compelled her to submit to laws, in the formation of which she had
not voice. ...
He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead.
He has taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns.
He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to . . . whom the guardianship of
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its contents were circulated through the anti-slavery press, receiving favor-
able coverage in the Liberator, the North Star, and the National Anti-Slavery
Standard. In contrast, the overall public reaction was overwhelmingly nega-
tive. Stanton sadly noted that "so pronounced was the popular voice against
us, in the parlor, press, and pulpit, that most of the ladies who had attended
the convention and signed the declaration ... withdrew their names and
influence and joined our persecutors."' However, the Woman's Movement
did not die, but instead grew steadily. Women began to organize and peti-
tion the legislatures for greater civil and political rights.'
During the antebellum period, the Woman's Movement focused almost
exclusively on lobbying the state legislatures. Women demanded the right to
contract, own property, control their own wages, exercise joint guardianship
over their children, enjoy full inheritance rights, sit on a jury, and vote. The
Movement's earliest successes involved gaining property rights for married
women. Susan B. Anthony led the fight for the adoption of a Married
Woman's Property Act in New York in 1856.' Nine states passed similar
acts before the Civil War began, but they were generally interpreted narrow-
ly by the courts.67 For example, almost all courts refused to allow a married
woman to control her earnings, even if she had a right to own separate
property." Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, all common law prop-
the children shall be given, as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of wom-
en-the law, in all cases, going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man,
and giving all power into his hands.
After depriving her of all rights as a married woman, if single, and the owner
of property, he has taxed her to support a government which recognizes her only
when her property can be made profitable to it.
He has monopolized . . . all the profitable employments .... As a teacher of
theology, medicine, or law, she is not known.
Now, in view of this entire disfranchisement of one-half the people of this
country, their social and religious degradation-in view of the unjust laws above
mentioned ... we insist that [women] have immediate admission to all the rights
and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the United States.
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848-1861, at 70-71 (Amo Press
ed., 1969) (1881).
64. REMINISCENCES, supra note 5, at 149.
65. Women's activity in America gained attention in Europe even at this early stage of
the Movement. In England, Harriet Taylor Mill cited to women's petitions and protests in
America as evidence that at least some women did not embrace their subordinate status in
society:
In the United States, at least, there are women, seemingly numerous, and now orga-
nized for action on the public mind, who demand equality in the fullest acceptation
of the word, and demand it by a straightforward appeal to men's sense of justice,
not plead for it with a timid deprecation of their displeasure....
HARRIET TAYLOR MILL, supra note 30, at 119-20 (first published in the Westminster Review, Oct.
1852).
66. The first state to pass a married woman's property act was Mississippi in 1839.
Chused, Married Women, supra note 17, at 1398.
67. See Joan Hoff Wilson, The Legal Status of Women in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twen-
tieth Centuries, 6 HUM. RTs. 125, 126-28 (1977); Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century
Married Women's Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women's Property Acts by Courts
and Legislatures, 29 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 3 (1985); Chused, Married Women, supra note 17, at 1400
n.21.
68. Kerber, supra note 43, at 120. Statutes protecting married women's earnings from the
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erty states had passed some form of law protecting married women's prop-
erty rights.69
III. IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR ON RIGHTS FOR WOMEN AND BLACK MEN
During the Civil War, the American Woman Suffrage Association sus-
pended its work toward equal rights for women and concentrated solely on
the Union war effort, operating under the new title of the Women's National
Loyal League.7' The Loyal League allied itself politically with the Radical
Republicans and the abolitionists. Following the war, the League focused its
efforts on securing passage of the Thirteenth Amendment.7'
The Thirteenth Amendment emancipated Blacks in 1865, thus ending the
institution of slavery in America, at least officially.' At this point, women's
rights advocates considered Black males' legal status to be equivalent to their
own--citizens with civil, but not political, rights.73 As discussed above,
society's refusal to recognize the political rights of Blacks and women hinged
upon these groups' inability to exercise civil rights and their subordination
to the political community of white males. The end of slavery and the pas-
sage of the married women's property acts began to erode this justification
for denying political rights to Blacks and women. However, the transition
from arguing for civil rights to arguing for political rights was complicated
by two factors: first, in reality, the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment
and various married women's property laws did not guarantee civil rights to
all citizens regardless of their race or gender; and second, due to the pres-
ence of racism and sexism in American society, unmarried white women and
institution of coverture generally did not appear until after the Civil War. Chused, Married
Women, supra note 17, at 1398 n.361.
69. Chused, Married Women, supra note 17, at 1397-1412. Although laws granting property
rights to married women greatly improved their legal status, most state legislatures did not
adopt these laws to demonstrate support for women's equal rights-married women's credi-
tors, who sought to attach their property, strongly advocated such laws. Kerber, supra note 43,
at 120. Conversely, other laws protected women's property from attachment for their
husband's debts. Chused, Married Women, supra note 17, at 1398-1400; Chused, Nineteenth Cen-
tury, supra note 67, at 3. In New York, Stanton reported that the Dutch aristocracy had joined
the campaign for a married woman's property bill to ensure that "their life-long accumula-
tions [would] descend to their daughters and grandchildren rather than pass into the hands
of dissipated, thriftless sons-in-law." REMINISCENCES, supra note 5, at 150. See also Kerber, supra
note 43, at 119.
70. See STANTON, supra note 1, at 50.
71. The Loyal League presented petitions supporting the abolition of slavery and passage
of the Thirteenth Amendment to Congress on February 9, 1864. The League eventually collect-
ed over 400,000 signatures. Id. at 78-79.
72. The Thirteenth Amendment reads:
Section One. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section Two. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriatelegislation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
73. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1279-80 (1991).
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Black freedmen had always been denied political rights, even though they
had previously enjoyed almost all the civil rights of citizenship. Therefore,
the movement to attain political equality for Blacks and women first had to
focus on securing civil rights, and second on overcoming the forces of rac-
ism and sexism in society.
A. WOMEN'S CIVIL RIGHTS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR
During the period immediately following the Civil War, the status of
women's civil rights improved in some respects, but deteriorated in others.
For the first time, laws were passed protecting married women's earnings
from their husbands' debts.74 However, other state laws advancing married
women's civil rights were actually repealed or diluted after the Civil War.75
For example, after the war, an 1860 New York law that had granted women
the right to equal guardianship of their children was amended so that it
merely prohibited the father from giving away the children without the
mother's written permission.76 The Woman's Declaration of Rights, present-
ed by Susan B. Anthony at the nation's Centennial Celebration of 1876, de-
nounced these setbacks in women's legal status:
Laws passed after years of untiring effort, guaranteeing married women
certain rights of property, and mothers the custody of their children, have
been repealed in States where we supposed all was safe. Thus have our
most sacred rights been made the football of legislative caprice, proving that
a power which grants as a privilege what by nature is a right, may withhold
the same as a penalty when deeming it necessary for its own perpetua-
tion."
The attempt to eradicate the legal disabilities associated with marriage was
complicated by the fact that marriage, unlike slavery, never ceased to exist.
Prior to ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the legal process by
which one person became the property of another was characterized as a
contract, and as such was regulated by the state. The Thirteenth Amendment
abolished these unconscionable contracts; thus men previously considered
"property" instantly became free individuals, vested with natural rights. The
contract of marriage, however, was never abolished, nor did anyone, except
the most radical of women's rights advocates, suggest that it should be.78
Throughout history, most societies have considered the institution of mar-
74. See Chused, Married Women, supra note 17, at 1424 n.361.
75. Susan Faludi hypothesizes that, throughout American history, the status of women's
rights has ebbed and flowed, resulting in alternating periods of progress and backlash. Faludi
identifies the late nineteenth century as a period of backlash against women. SUSAN FALUDI,
BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 48-50 (1991).
76. FREEDOM, FEMINISM, AND THE STATE, supra note 29, at 8.
77. This statement was presented as the sixth "Article of Impeachment" in the Declaration
of Rights. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1876-1885, at 32-33
(Amo Press ed., 1969) (1886).
78. The "free love" movement, associated primarily with activist Victoria Woodhull, had
only a limited following. See Ellen Carol Dubois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal
Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 74 J. AM. HIST. 836, 855 (1987).
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riage and the family unit as vital to their own survival. Even the most vocal
of the early feminists argued only to revise the terms of the marriage con-
tract, not do away with it altogether.
Unlike the slave, the woman-at least in theory-had voluntarily en-
tered into the contract by which she ceded her rights to another human be-
ing, her husband. Like any other contract, the marriage license was regulated
completely by state law, and the Federal Government had no power to dic-
tate its terms. However, the voluntary nature of this contractual relationship
was somewhat illusory. Economic necessity pressured women to marry, re-
gardless of whether they wanted a family.' Institutions of higher learning
denied admission to women, and even if a woman did become competent in
a profession, the state had the power to deny her a license to practice.80
Most of the jobs available to women involved low-paying, menial labor."' A
single woman could only be economically secure if she came from a very
wealthy family, or if she were a well provided-for widow. Women's strug-
gles for political rights thus occurred in a context in which almost all wom-
en were bound to a marriage contract.
B. CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD
The backlash against the movement to guarantee civil rights for Blacks
was more visible and violent than the effort to rescind civil rights gained by
women, especially in the South. Yet initially, only conservative Republicans
emphasized the need to ensure civil rights for Blacks, while the Radicals
concentrated on demands for political rights-namely, enfranchisement.
When state elections indicated that implementation of "universal manhood
suffrage" would not be politically feasible in 1866, the Radicals amended
their efforts to include the attainment of civil rights as well.82 As a result,
in 1866, Congress enacted legislation intended to abolish the notorious
Southern "Black codes"-laws which attempted to preserve slavery in form
if not in fact 8 3-by statutorily guaranteeing "civil rights" to all citizens, re-
gardless of race." The nineteenth century conception of "civil rights" re-
ferred to those protections considered necessary to defend the fundamental
"natural" or common law rights of "life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of
happiness."85 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 listed the following as examples
79. At the end of the nineteenth century, fewer than twenty percent of women were in
the laborforce. Approximately five percent of married women were employed outside the
household. Chused, Married Women, supra note 17, at 1396 n.192.
80. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Bradwell v. Illinois).
81. In 1870, there were approximately 1.3 million female wage earners in the United
States. Approximately seventy percent of these women were domestic servants; 24 percent
worked in textile, clothing, and shoe factories. DuBois, supra note 19, at 128.
82. See JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 33 (1956); Robert
J. Kaczorowski, To Begin the Nation Anew: Congress, Citizenship, and Civil Rights After the Civil
War, 92 AM. HIST. REV. 45, 49 (1987).
83. See Kaczorowski, supra note 82, at 51 (discussing the impact of Southern Black codes).
84. Freedmen's Bureau Act, 14 Stat. 173 (1866); Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
85. See Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal Protection
Clause, Dr. DuBois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HIsT. 884, 886 (1987).
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of rights protected by the legislation: "the right to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue and be sued, and to give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell,
lease, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit to all laws and proceedings for the security of person and proper-
ty."' Section Seven of the Freedmen's Bureau Act restates this litany of
rights.87
Prior to the Reconstruction period, the civil rights field was dominated
by state law, although Article IV of the Constitution prohibited states from
discriminating against citizens of other states in the administration of these
civil rights. The Comity Clause of Article IV provides that "the Citizens of
each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States."' However, in 1866 Congress conferred more decision-mak-
ing power regarding civil rights to the Federal Government with the passage
of the Civil Rights Act. 9
Opponents of federal civil rights legislation claimed that in enacting
these laws, Congress had exceeded the powers prescribed to it by the Con-
stitution." In response, Senator Trumbull and other Radical Republicans
claimed that the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of involuntary servitude
granted Congress this power.9 They maintained that certain fundamental
rights "belong[ed] to every man as a free man [and were protected] under
the Constitution as it now exists . .,92 The argument was essentially that,
if the Federal Government did not regulate and enforce civil rights in the
South, freedmen would remain slaves in form if not in fact; once the former
slave became a free man, he attained self-ownership and therefore was enti-
tled to all the civil rights inherent in being a free individual.
86. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866); see Tushnet, supra note 85, at 886.
87. Senator Trumbull presented the Freedmen's Bureau Bill to the Senate on January 5,
1866. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 209-10 (1866).
88. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2, cl. 1. The most oft-cited judicial definition of Article IV Privi-
leges and Immunities appears in Corfield v. Coryell:
The right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other
State ... to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and main-
tain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of
property ... and an exemption from higher taxes ... than are paid by other citi-
zens of the State, may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens, which are clearly ...fundamental; to which may be added the elective
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in
which it is to be exercised.
6 F. Cas. (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) (emphasis added). Note that during the New Depar-
ture movement of the 1870s, woman suffragists challenged their second-class citizenship and
demanded the franchise as a Privilege and Immunity of citizenship under Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but this argument was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court.
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874).
89. See Kaczorowski, supra note 82, at 54-55.
90. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1120 (1866) (comments by Rep. Rogers).
91. The House floor manager of the Civil Rights Act, James Wilson, stated that "[t]he
possession of these rights by the citizen raises by necessary implication the power in Con-
gress to protect them." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118-1119 (1866). See HYMAN &
WIECEK, supra note 17, at 386-404, 407; Kaczorowski, supra note 82, at 47-48, 60.
92. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 476 (1866).
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Many members of Congress did not believe that the abolition of slavery
had vested the power to regulate civil rights in the national government.
President Andrew Johnson vetoed both civil rights bills for this reason.93 In
response to such concerns, the Radical Republicans took steps to protect
Congress' power to regulate civil rights by amending the Constitution. John
Bingham, a Republican from Ohio, was the primary drafter of Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment. While Bingham strongly advocated equal
political and civil rights for Blacks, he believed that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and Freedmen's Bureau Act could not be legally enforced without a
constitutional amendment." Republicans defined the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Section One as a reiteration of the rights set forth in the Re-
construction civil rights legislation.9"
C. CONSTITUTIONALIZING CIVIL RIGHTS-SECTION ONE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
As adopted, Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment reads as fol-
lows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.'
The first sentence of Section One addressed the issue of national citizenship
and overturned the Supreme Court's infamous Dred Scott decision. ' In Dred
Scott, the Court had ruled that even free Blacks were not citizens of the
United States, posing the following question:
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as
slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought
into existence by the Constitution of the United States, and as such become
entitled to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guaranteed by that
instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the privilege of suing in a
court of the United States... 98
93. President Johnson vetoed the Civil Rights Bill on March 27, 1966; the veto was over-
ridden by the Senate on April 6, 1866, and by the House on April 9, 1866. CONG. GLOBE
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1681, 1859, 1861 (1866). See JAMES, supra note 82, at 97-99, 189. Presi-
dent Johnson also vetoed the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. CONG. GLOBE, supra, at 915-17.
94. Bingham voted against the Civil Rights Bill for this reason. CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1866, reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENT DEBATES 186 (Alfred
Avins ed., 1967). See also JAMES, supra note 82, at 89, 189.
95. JAMES, supra note 82, at 161 (citing Author, Article, CINCINNATI COM., Aug. 3, 1866).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
97. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
98. Id. at 403.
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The Court's answer to this question was a resounding "no," holding that an
individual state could not, by granting a slave his freedom, bestow upon
him all the Privileges and Immunities of a citizen of the United States, there-
by "cloth[ing] him with all the privileges of a citizen in every other
State . .. "" In other words, as long as a black man could be deprived of
his self-ownership in any state in the Union, he could not be considered a
citizen of the Union itself.
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment addressed the issue by ex-
pressly granting state and national citizenship to "all persons born or natu-
ralized in the United States." "1 ° The Philadelphia American underlined the
importance of the citizenship issue in an editorial that urged ratification of
the Amendment: "If there be one lesson written in bloody letters by the
War, it is that the national citizenship must be paramount to that of the
State." 1' Since women had always been considered national citizens---even
under the Dred Scott holding-it must be assumed that the drafters of Sec-
tion One intended to include women within the broadly defined group enti-
tled to national citizenship.
The second sentence of Section One delineates the basic civil rights to
which national citizens are entitled. °2 In addition, the Section creates a
"floor" of basic rights to which all persons--citizens and aliens alike-are
entitled, namely, fundamental Due Process and Equal Protection of the
law."0
Surprisingly, very little of the voluminous debate that accompanied the
adoption of Section One even addressed the question of how the Amend-
ment would affect women's civil rights."1' However, in light of the contem-
poraneous advances in women's common law property rights through state
legislation, it appears likely that, had Congress wanted to exclude women
from coverage under Section One and thus deny women the civil rights of
citizenship, it would have done so explicitly, as it did in crafting Section
Two's denial to women of the right to vote."°
99. Id. at 406.
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
101. See Kaczorowski, supra note 82.
102. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
103. Radical Republican Senator Jacob M. Howard described Section One protection of non-
citizens:
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State from
depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person, whoever he
may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or from denying
him the equal protection of the laws of the State.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong, 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866).
104. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281,
1283 n.12 (1991).
105. See Nina Morais, Sex Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment: Lost History, 97 YALE
L.J. 1153 (1988).
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IV. FIGHTING FOR THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN AND BLACK MEN IN
THE POST-WAR ERA
At the end of the Civil War, the leaders of the Woman's Movement
envisioned the creation of a "universal suffrage campaign" that would unite
Blacks and women in a struggle to attain equal political rights-namely, the
vote. The American Equal Rights Association (AERA) was formed to pursue
that end."° However, the AERA was destined to have a short existence,
and, as far as political rights were concerned, the alliance between the move-
ments for sexual and racial equality was short-lived.
A. THE DISINTEGRATION OF A COALITION
Events in the State of Kansas illustrate how the theretofore harmonious
union of former abolitionists and women's rights advocates abruptly ended.
When amendments were offered at the 1867 Kansas constitutional convention
to remove the words "white" and "male" from the state's suffrage qualifica-
tions, Republican Congressmen balked at the linkage of equal rights for
women and Black men. Women, led by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth
Cady Stanton, launched a campaign for woman suffrage in Kansas with no
help from their former political allies; the state Republican party vigorously
campaigned against them, while the national Republican organization offered
no help or words of encouragement."° A similar scenario occured during
New York's 1867 constitutional convention."
Radical Republicans claimed that linking woman suffrage with the
struggle to secure Black males' right to vote would reduce the likelihood of
enfranchising former male slaves. Wendell Phillips, then head of the Ameri-
can Anti-Slavery Society, argued that the alliance "would lose for the Negro
far more than we should gain for the woman.""° He wrote: "As Abraham
Lincoln said, one war at a time, so I say one question at a time. This hour
belongs to the negro.""' In response to this contention, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton inquired: "Do you believe the African race is composed entirely of
males?""'
106. The AERA was formed when the following resolution, presented by Susan B. Antho-
ny, was unanimously adopted at the National Women's Rights Convention of 1866:
Whereas, By the act of Emancipation and the Civil Rights bill, the negro and wom-
an now hold the same civil and political status, alike needing only the ballot; and
whereas the same arguments apply equally to both classes, proving all partial legis-
lation fatal to republican institutions, therefore, Resolved, That the time has come for
an organization that shall demand Universal Suffrage, and that hereafter we shall be
known as the "AMERICAN EQUAL RIGHTS ASSOCIATION."
STANTON, supra note 1, at 171-72.
107. See REMINISCENCES, supra note 5, at 245-58; DuBoIS, supra note 19, at 79-104; STANTON,
supra note 1, at 229-68.
108. See DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 66-67, 87-90; STANTON, supra note 1, at 269-312.
109. JAMES, supra note 82, at 8 (citing Letter from Wendell Phillips to Elizabeth Cady
Stanton (May 10, 1865)).
110. DuBois, supra note 19, at 59 (quoting Author, American Anti-Slavery Anniversary, STAN-
DARDS, 2 (May 13, 1865). See generally, WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 136-39 (1988).
111. DUBOIS, supra note 19, at 60 (quoting Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Wendell
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Despite Republican assertions to the contrary, it appears that Kansas
voters were not necessarily more opposed to woman suffrage than they were
to Black suffrage. With no support from the majority Republican party, ap-
proximately one-third of Kansas voters supported the enfranchisement of
women in 1867, only a thousand fewer than those supporting suffrage for
Blacks." 2 Anthony and Stanton claimed that the same group of voters sup-
ported both measures, despite the Democratic party's endorsement of
woman's suffrage and its opposition to suffrage for Blacks."3 It seems un-
likely that white males in the South would have preferred to enfranchise
Black males rather than white women.14
Radical Republicans' sexism contributed to the party's ultimate abandon-
ment of the Woman's Movement."' They assumed that Black women's
rights would be protected by newly-enfranchised Black men; the same rea-
soning justified denying rights to all women."6 Congressman Ben Wade
asserted that women did not need the right to vote because they were in
"high fellowship with those who do govern, who, to a great extent, act as
their agents, their friends, promoting their interests in every vote they give,
and therefore communities get along very well without conferring this right
upon the female.""' Ironically, this same argument had been made during
the antebellum period to justify the slaveowners' status as their slaves' legal
guardians. Even so, Republicans acted upon the assumption that denying an
individual's political rights on the basis of sex was less injurious than doing
so on the basis of race."8
Phillips (May 25, 1865)).
112. Of 30,000 votes cast, 10,000 favored Black suffrage and 9,000 supported woman suf-
frage in the Kansas campaign. ADAMS, supra note 39, at 49.
113. During the Kansas campaign, Anthony and Stanton accepted funding from George
Train, a prominent Democrat and vocal racist. The Radical Republicans denounced this alli-
ance and called the suffragists themselves racists. See DUBoIs, supra note 19, at 93-100.
114. The opposite would seem to be the case. Later in the campaign, woman suffragists
suggested that the votes of white women could serve as an "antidote" to dilute the effects of
the Black man's vote (demonstrating that the tight alliance between abolitionists and women's
rights advocates had disintegrated in more ways than one). However, following the passage
of the Fifteenth Amendment, the South did not rush to enfranchise white women.
Sexism and racism were both powerful forces in the South. Speaking in opposition to
the Nineteenth Amendment, a judge addressing the Alabama State Bar predicted that the
ignorant Black woman voter "would unquestionably menace the domination of the White
race." He did not discuss the potential countervailing effects of the white woman's vote. Hon.
Emmet O'Neal, The Susan B. Anthony Anendmnent, 6 VA. L. REV. 338, 357 (1919).
115. Sexism here is broadly defined as the belief that the woman's place in society is
limited to the sphere of domesticity, and that, as a class, women are unfit to participate in
the civil and political realms of society.
116. At least one Black woman rejected this assumption. With regard to the issue, So-
journer Truth made the following statement:
I have a right to have just as much as a man. There is a great stir about colored
men getting their rights, but not a word about the colored women; and if colored
men get their rights, and not colored women theirs, you see the colored men will
be masters over the women, and it will be just as bad as it was before.
STANTON, supra note 1, at 193.
117. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1866); see NELSON, supra note 110, at 138.
118. NELSON, supra note 110, at 138-39 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064
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B. WOMEN'S OPPOSITION TO SECTION TWO OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment punished states that disfran-
chised male voters by reducing the size of their Congressional delegation in
Washington."9 It penalized no state for denying suffrage rights to women,
and, for the first time, introduced the word "male" into the Constitution."
However, the Constitution was not a sex-neutral document before this time;
at the time of the Constitution's adoption in 1789, women's exclusion from
the realm of political and civil rights did not need to be formalized by the
written word. The need to include the word "male" in the Fourteenth
Amendment demonstrated that the Woman's Movement had begun to alter
some of these assumptions. 2'
Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony believed that it was
critical for women to claim their right to suffrage during Reconstruction-a
radical period of Constitutional reform." Stanton and Anthony felt that if
women could not seize this opportunity, their next chance for enfranchise-
ment would lie many years in the future. Stanton emphasized this point in
an 1866 letter to Radical Republican Gerrit Smith: "If that word 'male' be
inserted, it will take us a century at least to get it out."'2
The suffragists' strong opposition to the inclusion of the word "male" in
Section Two was directly at odds with their historic ties to the abolitionist
movement and general (although certainly not monolithic) support for
Blacks' equal rights. Until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
women had considered Black men's legal status analogous to their own.
However, when asked to postpone demands for their own equality and
elevate Black men's political status above their own, white women leaders
(1866)). Feeling embittered and betrayed following the 1867 Kansas suffrage campaign, the
leaders of the woman's movement wrote: "[W]e still wonder at the solid incapacity of all
men to understand that woman feels the invidious distinctions of sex exactly as the black
man does those of color ... that she feels as keenly as man the injustice of disfranchise-
ment." STANTON, supra note 1, at 265.
119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §2.
120. Id.
121. In a letter to Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Senator Charles Sumner, a Radical Republican
and former ally of the woman's movement, indicated that he "wrote over nineteen pages of
foolscap to get rid of the word 'male' and yet keep 'negro suffrage' as a party measure in-
tact; but it could not be done."' STANTON, supra note 1, at 848. See DuBoiS, supra note 19, at
60.
122. See DuBois, supra note 78, at 844.
123. DuBois, supra note 19, at 61 (Letter from Elizabeth Cady Stanton to Gerrit Smith (Jan.
1, 1866)). Stanton's prediction that it would take years of effort to secure a woman's right to
vote was accurate. Sixty years after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, feminist
Carrie Chapman Catt wrote:
To get that word, male, out of the Constitution, cost the women of this country 52
years of pauseless campaign; 56 state referendum campaigns; 480 legislative campaigns
to get state amendments submitted; 47 state constitutional convention campaigns; 277
state party convention campaigns; nineteen campaigns to get suffrage planks in the
party platforms; nineteen campaigns with nineteen successive Congresses to get the
federal amendment submitted, and the final ratification campaign.
ADAMS, supra note 39, at 48.
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like Anthony and Stanton refused. This tension split the Woman's Movement
in half.
Lucy Stone and Henry Blackwell organized the more conservative
branch of the Woman's Movement, the American Woman Suffrage Associa-
tion (AWSA), which joined the Republican campaign to secure ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment as written. Although the group's ultimate objec-
tive remained woman suffrage, its members considered Black men's need for
political equality more critical than women's during the Reconstruction era.
They believed that, once Black men secured their rights, the Republican
party would then pursue voting rights for women.'24 The Republicans nev-
er lived up to their promise.
A more radical organization, the National Woman's Suffrage Association
(NWSA), under the leadership of Stanton and Anthony, continued to cam-
paign actively for women's suffrage by launching a campaign in opposition
to the Fourteenth Amendment. Stanton wrote:
I would call attention of the women of the nation to the fact that, under the
Federal Constitution as it now exists, there is not one word that limits the
right of Suffrage to any privileged class. The attempt to turn the wheels of
civilization backward, on the part of Republicans claiming to be the liberal
party, should rouse every woman in the nation to a prompt exercise of the
only right she has in the Government, the right of petition."
Anthony and Stanton collected thousands of signatures on petitions demand-
ing that ratifiers include woman suffrage in the Fourteenth Amendment, but
their former allies in Congress offered little encouragement. Senator Charles
Sumner, a leading Radical Republican, presented woman suffrage petitions to
the Congress, but with a disclaimer: "[I]t was not judicious for [women] at
this moment to bring forward their claims so as to compromise in any way
the great question of equal rights for an enfranchised race now before Con-
gress.""2 6 Democratic Congressmen often used the women's petitions and
protests to embarrass the Republicans, but the Democrats did not make
women's suffrage a plank in their party platform.'7 In the popular press of
the day, the women's claims received little support. Typically, the New York
Tribune suggested that "[t]he sure panacea for such ills as the Massachusetts
petitioners complain of, is a wicker-work cradle and a dimple-cheeked ba-
by.,1
124. See SARA M. EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY 124 (1989); DuBois, supra note 19, at 167.
125. REMINISCENCES, supra note 5, at 244 (citing Author letter in ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD
(Jan. 2, 1866)).
126. STANTON, supra note 1, at 100.
127. On January 23, 1866, Representative Brooks, a New York Democrat, presented peti-
tions from Susan B. Anthony endorsing woman suffrage. During the debate for Black suffrage
in the District of Columbia, Brooks presented an amendment to prohibit voting discrimination
on the grounds of sex as well as color. When asked if he favored his own amendment,
Brooks replied, "I am in favor of my own color in preference to any other color, and I prefer
the white women of my country to the negro." Id. at 100.
128. Id. at 101.
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C. STRATEGIC DECISIONS FOR A "NEW DEPARTURE": CIVIL VERSUS
POLITICAL RIGHTS
Following the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Woman's
Movement shifted its focus from a state campaign for civil rights to a na-
tional campaign for political rights. The pointed exclusion of women from
the political guarantees offered to Black men by Section Two of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and later by the Fifteenth Amendment, solidified
women's status as the only remaining class of adult United States citizens
denied all political rights.
The new campaign linked the achievement of political rights to the
ongoing demands for equal civil status. The theory was that no government,
state or national, would fully guarantee a woman's natural or civil rights
unless she had a political right to participate in that government-unless she
had the right to vote."0 A second rationale extended the logic of the mar-
ried women's property acts to assert that since the legal disabilities associat-
ed with marriage had begun to disintegrate, married women theoretically
were independent citizens-not the dependents of their husbands. As auton-
omous individuals then, no logical reason remained to prevent women from
voting. At the seventh annual convention of the AWSA, the Reverend
Charles G. Ames made the following statement:
At present, the position of woman in the State is false, contradictory and
uncomfortable. She has ceased to be a nobody; but she is not yet conceded
to be somebody. As she has gained many rights which were once denied,
the old theory which made her a slave is overthrown; as she has not gained
the absolute and chartered right of self-government, the new theory of her
equality is not yet established. Of that equality suffrage is the symbol
130
Based on these theories, the Movement determined to secure the right
of suffrage for women. 3' The Movement adopted Anthony's proposed
129. The same rationale had been advanced during the Fourteenth Amendment debates to
secure suffrage for Black men. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 703-04 (1866) (state-
ments by Sen. William Pitt Fessenden).
130. STANTON, supra note 1, at 845.
131. Addressing a group of suffragists at a Washington convention, Susan B. Anthony
identified three directions in which the movement could proceed:
The first is for the legislatures of the various states to add women to those already
voters. Before the war this was the only way thought of, and during all those years
we petitioned the legislatures to submit an amendment striking the word "male"
from the suffrage clauses of the State constitutions. The second method is for Con-
gress to submit to the several legislatures a proposition for a Sixteenth Amendment.
The third plan is for women to take their right under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the National Constitution.
FREEDOM, FEMINISM, AND THE STATE, supra note 29, at 65-66. Anthony advocated the third
approach, because, as she accurately predicted:
[I]f we once establish the false principle, that United States citizenship does not
carry with it the right to vote . . . there is no end to the petty freaks and cunning
devices that will be resorted to, to exclude one and another class of citizens from
the right of suffrage.
Id. Civil rights cases upholding various "cunning devices" used to disenfranchise Blacks often
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strategy, which became known as the "New Departure". Throughout the
1870s, women claimed suffrage as a Privilege and Immunity guaranteed
under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.'32 In 1871 and 1872, suf-
fragists courted the attention of the judiciary by attempting to register and
vote in state and federal elections.'33 The first test case involved a group of
approximately seventy women who went to the polls in the District of Co-
lumbia and demanded to vote on April 20, 1871.' When denied the right
to do so, they sued the Board of Inspectors, challenging the statute restrict-
ing suffrage to males as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This suit
failed, as did most of the New Departure cases.3 '
The New Departure movement saw an inextricable link between civil
rights, as set forth in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
political rights of citizenship-most importantly the vote-which were guar-
anteed to Black men but not to women by Section Two of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This link, however, was not widely acknowledged by the male
political and juridical leaders of the day."3 The New Departure ended in
1873 when the Supreme Court, in Minor v. Happersett, held that the Privileg-
es and Immunities guaranteed by Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
cited precedents set by courts denying women's right to vote under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See ADAMS, supra note 39, at 66.
132. Initially, suffragists petitioned Congress for legislation that explicitly guaranteed Four-
teenth Amendment rights. Similar arguments for suffrage had been made on the behalf of
Black men with respect to both the Thirteenth Amendment and Article I, § 4 of the Constitu-
tion. Ultimately, all three of these demands failed. See STANTON, supra note 1, at 443-448;
JAMES, supra note 82, at 69. Following this effort, the suffragists shifted their attention from
the legislature to the judiciary.
133. The most prominent of the New Departure litigants was Susan B. Anthony. Unlike
the majority of the female parties to these lawsuits, Anthony appeared as a defendant. She
persuaded an election official to allow her to register and vote in the November 1872 elec-
tions, and later she was arrested for the criminal charge of illegal voting. Anthony appealed
to the jury during her trial: "We ask the juries to fail to return verdicts of 'guilty' against
honest, law-abiding, tax-paying United States citizens, as it is their duty to do .. " STANTON,
supra note 1, at 646. The trial judge refused to give Anthony's case to the jury and directed a
guilty verdict as a matter of law. Id.
134. See STANTON, supra note 1, at 587-99.
135. According to the suffragists, at least two judges did recognize the right to vote under
the Fourteenth Amendment-Howe, of the Wyoming territory, and Underwood of Virginia.
STANTON, supra note 1, at 640.
136. In an effort to defeat the Civil Rights Bill, Democrats argued that the term "civil
rights" would include the right to sit on a jury, to attend desegregated schools, to marry
interracially, and the right to vote. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 606 (1866), reprinted
in THE RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 94, at 140. The Republicans countered that rights
such as voting and attending public schools were social or political, and as such not covered
by the bill. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUC-
TION DEBATES, supra note 94, at 141 (statements by Rep. Moulton); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1117 (1866), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 94, at 163 (state-
ments by Rep. Wilson). To clarify this issue, the Republicans eventually amended the Civil
Rights Bill to verify that "nothing in this act shall be so construed as to affect the laws of
any State concerning the right of suffrage." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1162 (1866),
reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTION DEBATES, supra note 94, at 171. A similar debate raged over
the meaning of Privileges and Immunities under the Fourteenth Amendment. CONG. GLOBE,
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2466-67; JAMES, supra note 82, at 163.
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did not encompass voting rights. The New Departure's strategic decision to
link the political right of suffrage to the civil rights of citizenship had ended
in failure.'
In December 1872, Virginia L. Minor challenged Missouri's constitution-
al restriction of voting rights to males as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although the Court recognized that women were United States
citizens, it held that suffrage did not qualify as a Privilege or Immunity of
that citizenship." Chief Justice Waite found that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not create any new Privileges and Immunities for the citizen; it
merely "furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he
already had."" Because no state had allowed all citizens to vote at the
time the Constitution was ratified, the Court reasoned that suffrage could
not be a Privilege or Immunity of citizenship."
Minor severed the right to vote from the affirmative statement of nation-
al citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment, and in doing so, effectively
placed suffrage beyond the reach of the enforcement powers of the Federal
Government, except as narrowly defined in the Fifteenth Amendment. The
decision in Minor, in addition to denying suffrage to women, laid the
groundwork for cases restricting the right of suffrage for Black men and
women. Because the federal power to regulate suffrage was strictly limited
by the words of the Fifteenth Amendment, courts upheld white primaries,
poll taxes, literacy tests, and other devices used as surrogates for race.'4'
Women's rights advocates compared the Supreme Court's holding in
Minor to that in Dred Scott.'42 Minor constitutionalized women's status as
137. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874). The United States Supreme Court
never addressed the question of whether Privileges and Immunities encompassed voting rights
for Black males; the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 negated the need to do
so. State courts did address this issue, with varying results. In White v. Clements, 39 Ga.
232 (1869), the Georgia Supreme Court held that the right to hold political office was guaran-
teed by the Privileges and Immunities and Equal Protection Clauses of the State Constitution.
Dicta in Alabama and Indiana Supreme Court cases also suggested that Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment conferred political rights. See Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 196 (1877);
State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 393 (1871). But see Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299, 306 (1866) (citi-
zenship confers civil, not political, rights).
138. Minor asserted that women had always been citizens, even before the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 88 U.S. at 165-69.
139. 88 U.S. at 171.
140. Id. at 172-173.
141. See DuBois, supra note 78, at 860 (citing United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875)
and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875)).
142. The Declaration of Rights for Women, delivered by Susan B. Anthony on behalf of
the AWSA at the nation's Centennial celebration in 1876, criticizes the Supreme Court for its
rulings in Dred Scott and Minor:
The judiciary above the nation has proved itself but the echo of the party in power,
by upholding and enforcing laws that are opposed to the spirit and letter of the
constitution. When the slave power was dominant, the Supreme Court decided that
a black man was not a citizen, because he had not the right to vote; and when the
constitution was so amended as to make all persons citizens, the same high tribunal
decided that a woman, though a citizen, had not the right to vote. Such vacillating
interpretations of constitutional law unsettle our faith in judicial authority, and un-
dermine the liberties of the whole people.
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second-class citizens, much like Dred Scott had constitutionalized Blacks'
status as non-citizens approximately twenty years before. Just as with Dred
Scott, the effects of Minor ultimately would only be reversed by constitution-
al amendment. The Nineteenth Amendment finally gave women the right to
vote in 1920.""
V. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT GENDER JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court observed in Frontiero v. Richardson that "throughout
much of the nineteenth century the position of women in our society was, in
many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-Civil War slave
codes."'" Despite this history, with respect to the application of the Equal
Protection Clause, the judiciary has applied a lower level of scrutiny to gen-
der classifications than it has to classifications based upon race. The Supreme
Court has held that race is a "suspect" basis for classification by the
state.' Consequently, the courts evaluate the legitimacy of such classifica-
tions by applying a standard of "strict scrutiny" under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 In contrast, gender has been con-
sidered merely a "quasi-suspect" classification, and as such receives only
"intermediate" scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 47 As a result of
this historical jurisprudential anomaly, women have been deprived of equal
opportunity in jury service, education, employment, and a host of other
arenas.
A. TRIAL BY JURY
In 1879, in Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the
exclusion of Black men from jury service violated the Equal Protection guar-
antee of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Court's analysis in Strauder ar-
Susan B. Anthony & Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Declaration of Rights for Women, in SCOTT &
SCOTT, supra note 46, at 90, 94.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
144. 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973).
145. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (applying strict scrutiny to
the racial classification excluding Japanese citizens during World War II); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny to laws forbidding miscegenation).
146. If the state chooses to regulate on the basis of a suspect class it must do so to fur-
ther a compelling state interest, and it must utilize the least restrictive means to accomplish
its goal. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978).
147. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Other quasi-suspect
categories include alienage, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that states
cannot deny welfare benefits to aliens), and illegitimacy, see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968) (holding that law denying illegitimate children the right to recover benefits for mothers'
wrongful death violates Equal Protection Clause). For an overview discussion of Equal Protec-
tion Clause analysis and varying levels of scrutiny, see generally, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 586-93, 621-87 (11th ed. 1985).
148. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). Although most of the Fourteenth Amendment debate cen-
tered around the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Strauder focused on Equal Protection.
Technically, the Equal Protection Clause applies to all persons, not just citizens; Strauder did
not hold that non-citizens were entitled to serve on a jury. However, defining jury service as
one of the Privileges and Immunities of citizenship also would have been problematic, since
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bitrarily distinguishes between sex and race discrimination; yet acknowledges
a link between jury service and the rights inherent in citizenship:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a
statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors,
because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects
fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an as-
sertion of their inferiority. 9
The Court does not explain why this logic does not apply to women, who
were clearly also recognized as citizens. Furthermore, the Court completely
ignores the implications of its decision for Black women.
The Strauder decision rested on a citizen-defendant's right to be tried by
a jury of his peers, rather than a citizen's right to sit on a jury:
The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed to every citizen of West Virginia
by the constitution of that State, and the constitution of juries is a very es-
sential part of the protection such a mode of trial is intended to secure. The
very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is of...
persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds."
Again, the Court's reasoning would seem to apply equally well to a ban on
women in the jury box. Instead, the Strauder Court effectively held that the
Fourteenth Amendment only protected against discrimination on the basis of
race or color. 5' At the time Strauder was decided, women's rights advo-
cates were vigorously demanding the right to be tried by a jury of their
peers, as was evidenced by this clause of the Declaration of Rights for Wom-
en, delivered at the 1876 Centennial Celebration:
The Right of trial by a jury of one's peers was so jealously guarded that
States refused to ratify the original Constitution until it was guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment. And yet the women of this nation have never been
allowed a jury of their peers-being tried in all cases by men, native and
foreign, educated and ignorant, virtuous and vicious. Young girls have been
arraigned ... for the crime of infanticide; tried, convicted, and hanged ...
while no woman's voice could be heard in their defense ...
jury service was generally considered to be a political, rather than a civil, right. See CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866);
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866) (debate during discussion of the Civil Rights
Act over whether jury is civil or political right). Cf. Tushnet, supra note 85, at 887 (arguing
that the right to sit on a jury should be considered a civil right, because the right to. offer
testimony may be worthless if the testimony will only be heard by white jurors). Alternative-
ly, Tushnet argues that "[tihe adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment essentially eliminated the
need to distinguish between civil and political rights. Once equality with respect to the core
political rights was guaranteed, it was pointless to allow discrimination with respect to rights
that were ambiguously political." Id. at 887. The same argument can be made for extending
other political rights to women after the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. See Amar,
The Bill of Rights, supra note 73, at 1202-03.
149. 100 U.S. at 308.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Declaration of Rights for Women, in SCOTr & ScOTT, supra note 46, at 91. Even during
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In the mid-twentieth century, 21 states still barred women from jury service.
Some progress had been made by 1961: only three states explicitly banned
women from the jury box,'53 but eighteen states prevented their participa-
tion indirectly by allowing automatic exemptions for women." The Su-
preme Court did not find the systematic exclusion of women from juries to
be unconstitutional until 1975, in Taylor v. Louisiana.'55 Even this decision
was based upon the rights of criminal defendants; it did not explicitly recog-
nize a woman's right to sit on a jury. Not until 1994 did the Supreme Court
hold that the use of peremptory challenges made on the basis of gender
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 The
use of peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors on the basis of race
was declared unconstitutional in 1986. 57
B. THE RIGHT TO BE A MEMBER OF A PROFESSION
In a second early interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court rejected the idea that the right to practice law in a state court
was a Privilege or Immunity of United States citizenship. Bradwell v. Illinois
concerned the case of Myra Bradwell, the editor of the Chicago Legal
News." Bradwell passed the Illinois bar examination in September of 1869
and applied for admission to the state bar, but was rejected because she was
a woman.' 9 The ,Illinois Supreme Court had determined that Myra
Bradwell could not become a member of the bar because she was married,
and therefore would not be bound by any contracts, including those between
the pre-abolition stage of the Woman's Movement, Sarah Grimke had made similar demands:
In ecclesiastical, as well as civil courts, woman is tried and condemned, not by a
jury of her peers, but by beings, who regard themselves as her superiors in the
scale of creation. Her condition resembles, in some measure, that of the slave, who,
while he is denied the advantages of his more enlightened master, is treated with
even greater rigor of the law.
Grimke, supra note 20, at 77. See also HARRIET TAYLOR MILL, supra note 30, at 97.
153. See. Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59, 60 n.5
(1986).
154. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961) (upholding unanimously a state jury selec-
tion process whereby women were automatically excluded from jury service unless they affir-
matively waived the exemption).
155. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
156. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S.Ct. 1419 (1994). In J.E.B., the Court notes that
"with respect to jury service, African-Americans and women share a history of total. exclusion,
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attorney and client. Bradwell argued that her right to pursue an occupation
was a Privilege and Immunity of her citizenship guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment."w She maintained unsuccessfully that, while state legis-
latures could constitutionally regulate admission to the bar, they could not
exclude an entire class of citizens from it. 6'
VI. CONCLUSION
Sexism and racism in American society share many common philosophi-
cal, historical, and legal roots. Both have resulted in the deprivation of the
civil and political rights of United States citizens. Therefore, classifications on
the basis of race and gender should both be subjected to strict scrutiny by
the courts. If the current distinction between gender and race has any logical
basis at all, it apparently stems from the subjective belief that sex discrimina-
tion is somehow less injurious to its victim than is discrimination on the
basis of race. Women of all races would probably dispute this conclusion; in
any event, it is insufficient to support Constitutional interpretation.
The abhorrent treatment of women under the common law and statuto-
ry law of the United States should compel the recognition of gender as a
suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; as such, the Supreme Court should evaluate gender classifications
under a standard of strict scrutiny.
160. 83 U.S. at 133-134.
161. Id. at 135.

